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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE LEGAL STATUS IN MISSOURI OF
BUSINESS TRUSTS.*
In determining the legality of an organization in any given
jurisdiction, the problem is to ascertain what the courts of
last resort of that jurisdiction have held. If there has been
no adjudication, then the task is to arrive at the most prob-
able decision of such courts in the light of long established
legal principles and the peculiar local statutes. Unfortun-
ately, in Missouri, because of the comparative novelty of the
business trust, there has been almost a total lack of deci-
sions upon the subject. Hence, until there is such an adju-
dication by the Supreme Court of Missouri, anything that
might be said as to the legal status of the business trust
must necessarily be largely conjectural.
To be sure, there is nothing new in the trust relation,
which is supposed to have had its origin as far back as the
ancient Roman fidei commissum.' It is rather in its quite
recent application to a form of business organization and
its growing commercial importance that its novelty exists.
There is, indeed, a remarkable similarity of purpose between
the trust of old, and the business trust, or Massachusetts
trust, as it is commonly called. Trusts were first intro-
duced into England, as creatures of equity, to circumvent
the public policy of the kingdom; to avoid the ancient re-
strictions on alienation, the numerous fines and reliefs im-
posed by the feudal law of tenure, the burdensome Statute
of Mortmain, and finally, the dangers of confiscation and
attainder resulting from participation in the civil wars be-
tween the two great houses of Lancaster and York.2
*Awarded Thesis Prize, June, 1923, Washington University School of Law.
1. Perry on Trusts, p. 3.
2. Tiedeman on Real Property, section 438.
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In a like manner, business trusts have developed as sub-
stitutes for business corporations because of the many dis-
advantages and burdensome incidents imposed by the State
apon corporate existence. There is, first of all, the great
popular prejudice against corporations, as evidenced by par-
tisan jury verdicts and the harassing, supervisory statutes
enacted by the various State legislatures. Moreojer, the
corporation, being an artificial person has no legal exist-
ence beyond the boundaries of the State which created it. 3
Nor is it a citizen within the meaning of Article 4. Section
2, of the Constitution of United States, which guarantees
that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,"
so that any State may impose numerous prerequisites as
conditions to doing business in it." The business trust, last-
ly, seeks to evade the varied and heavy taxation which the
business corporation has to bear-the organization tax, the
franchise tax, and numerous others.
But whatever its legal purpose and commercial import-
ance, the fact remains that there is nothing illegal in the
organization itself at common law.5 That therefore in Mis-
souri, in the absence of statutory regulation, the status of
business trusts is an absolutely legal one. All persons, sui
juris, have the same power to create trusts, and it is rea-
sonably inferred that there is nothing illegal in the fact
that the purpose of the trust is the management of a busi-
ness for profit. This result has been established by a long
line of cases too numerous to mention and is undoubtedly
the law today.'
One of the foremost and earliest cases establishing this
contention is the leading English decision upon the subject,
3. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 519.
4. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168.
5. Perry on Trusts, p. 28.
6. Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223; Spotswood v. Morris, 12 Idaho 360;
Hoadley v. County Commissioners, 105 Mass. 519.
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Smith v. Anderson." In that case, shares to the amount
of £400,000 were purchased by subscription in the Submar-
ine Telegraph Company, and the title to the property of the
company and the management thereof was vested in a
board of trustees. The point to be decided was whether or
not this organization was an association of more than twen-
ty persons formed for the purpose of carrying on a busi-
ness within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1862, s. 4,
for if it was, then not being registered, it was illegal. In
overruling the decision of the Master of the Rolls, the Court
of Appeal held that the object of the deed of settlement was
not to authorize the carrying on of a business within the
meaning of the Act, but that it was to provide for the man-
agement of a trust fund by the trustees for the benefit of
the cestuis que trustent (the shareholders).
Assuming then the legality of the business trust in the
absence of relevant statutory regulation, a doubt must arise
as to whether the business trust is a partnership, or a pure
trust. If the former, then the shareholders are personally
liable for the debts of the association, and the business
loses an attribute that is indispensable to an adequate
substitute for a corporation. In fact, if the business is a
partnership it must necessarily assume all the incidents of
the partnership relation. Thus, if one of the shareholders
died, his legal representatives would be entitled to an ac-
counting, in equity, for his interest. Such proceedings, it
can readily be seen, are wholly inconsistent with, any prac-
tical association of a great number of shareholders.
Happily, through a long line of decisions an accepted test
has been laid down for determining the distinction between
the two forms of business organizations. The courts have
repeatedly held that any business trust in which the share-
holders, or cestuis que trustent have no substantial control
of the management of the trust property by directing the
7. L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 247.
138
Washington University Open Scholarship
LEGAL STATUS IN MISSOURI OF BUSINESS TRUSTS
trustees, is a pure trust.8 Perhaps the leading case of
Williams v. Milton9 will suffice to illustrate this type of busi-
ness trust. The case came up in Massachusetts upon a ques-
tion of whether the Boston Personal Property Trust was
to be taxed under Massachusetts statutes as a partnership,
or as a trust estate. The court held that whenever persons
associate themselves to carry on a business for their mutual
profit they are none the less partners because their shares
are represented by transf3rable certificates and as a matter
of convenience the legal title to the partnership property
is taken in the name of a third party. If such third party or
trustee, as he is called, is under the direction and control
of the shareholders, he is merely their agent and they as as-
sociated principals constitute a partnership.
But in this case the shareholders exercised no such con-
trol. There was no provision in the indenture of trust for
any meeting to be held by them and the extent of their power
in the management of the business was merely to give or
withhold their consent to any alteration or termination of
the trust agreement. Accordingly, the court held that the
property of the Boston Personal Property Trust was not
taxable as partnership property, but that it was taxable
only as property held in trust.
The case of Frost v. Thompson,"° on the other hand, il-
lustrates an association which was held to be a partnership.
There, the certificate holders had the power to remove the
trustees and appoint others in their place; they could meet
and vote to amend the declaration of trust or terminate it
entirely. Therefore, the holder of a promissory note of the
voluntary association, the Buena Vista Fruit Company, was
not precluded from bringing a suit in equity against all the
shareholders as partners to establish the debt and to have
8. Mayo v. Moritz, 151 Mass. 481; Connolly v. Lyons & Co., 82 Tex.
664; Crocker v. Malley, 224 U. S. 223.
9. 215 Mass. 1.
10. 219 Mass. 360.
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applied in satisfaction of it partnership property which
could not be attached at law. The court again clearly laid
down the established rule. The learned Chief Justice said:
.'A declaration of trust or other instrument providing for
the holding of property by trustees for the benefit of the
owners of assignable certificates representing the beneficial
interest in the property may create a trust or it may create
a partnership. Whether it is the one or the other depends
upon the way in which the trustees are to conduct the af-
fairs committed to their charge. If they act as principals
and are free from the control of the certificate holders, a
trust is created; but if they are subject to the control of
the certificate holders, it is a partnership."
This rule must necessarily raise the question of how much
control the certificate holders must exercise to make the
association a partnership. They can exercise no substan-
tial control of the trustees, nor can they direct the business
policy of the organization. They cannot meet and alter the
declaration of trust nor can they terminate it. They can-
not remove their trustees without cause and appoint new
members in their stead. In short, the sole right of the
cestui que trust is to have the property administered in
his interests by the trustees, to receive income while the
trust lasts, and to share in the corpus when the trust ter-
minates.
The conclusion might safely be reached, then, that the
Missouri Supreme Court will apply the rule established in
Massachusetts and followed in the great majority of States,
as to the partnership nature of the business trust. Un-
doubtedly, it will construe some of them to be pure trusts
and others partnership associations. It will be necessary
to examine each particular association and determine from
the declaration of trust and the actual conduct of the cer-
tificate holders and trustees, the extent and limitations
of their power. Then, and only then, can it safely fix the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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legal status of the business trust as a pure trust or a part-
nership.
Up to this point, to avoid confusion, the absence of rele-
vant statutes affecting the business trust has been assumed.
There are in Missouri, as in a great many other States,
numerous statutes regulating corporations, and particu-
larly a constitutional provision" and a statute12 defining
such a corporation as is amenable to the other regulatory
statutes. The Missouri Legislature has enacted :-- 'The
term 'corporation', as used in this chapter, shall be con-
strued to include all joint stock companies or associations
having any powers or privileges not possessed by individ-
uals or partnerships." To determine whether the busi-
ness trust is within the meaning of this statute, two ques-
tions must be answered. First, does it possess powers
and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships;
secondly, is the business trust an association?
That it does possess powers or privileges not possessed
by individuals or partnerships can scarcely be denied. In
Kansas, under a statute entirely similar to that of Missouri,
a business trust was held to exercise many of these powers
and privileges, some of which the court points out.1"  For
example, there is in most declarations of trust a limited
liability clause, under which, both shareholders and trus-
tees are exempt from all personal liability. The business
trust is not dissolved at the death of a trustee or certifi-
cate holder. The joint property of the organization is
continued during the existence of the trust freed from the
rules of joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Moreover,
it may adopt a common seal, and the interest of the share-
holder is represented and measured by negotiable shares
of certificates which are given voting power the same as cor-
11. Constitution of Missouri, Art. 12, Sec. 11.
12. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 9722.
13. Lumber Co. v. State Charter Board, 107 Kan. 153.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss2/5
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
porate stock. Lastly, the trustees may elect officers who have
the authority and duties incident to like officers in cor-
porations; and in such elections a majority vote, and not a
concurrence of the trustees, is sufficient.
While Kansas has held that the business trust does pos-
sess powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or
partnerships, at least one State, Idaho, is at variance with it.
In Spotswood v. Morris,14 that court held that the business
trust could not legally possess or exercise powers or priv-
ileges of corporations, since to exercise such a prerogative
requires a sovereign grant. But as a recent Kansas case,"
in upholding the earlier view of the same court, pointed
out, the Idaho decision rests on the fact that their statute
is different from that of Kansas. The Idaho statute reads:
"The term 'corporation,' as used in this article shall be held
and construed to include all associations, and joint stock
companies having or exercising any of the powers or privi-
leges of corporations not possessed by individuals or part-
nerships." Of course to exercise legally a privilege of a
corporation requires a legislative grant. But in the Kansas
statute and the Missouri statute the words ",of corporations"
are omitted and therefore a different legislative intent
must be presumed. In the Missouri statute it is merely
"powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or part-
nerships" and it has been pointed out that the business
trust does in every sense exercise such powers.
Granting then that the business trust does usurp many
corporate privileges, the next consideration is whether that
organization is an association within the meaning of Section
9722, R. S. Mo. 1919. Singularly enough, none of the deci-
sions construing the so-called Massachusetts trust under
statutes similar to those of Missouri, have considered this
question. Thus, in both of the Kansas cases,"0 where the
14. 12 Idaho 360
15. Harris v. U. S. Mexico Oil Co., 204 Pac. 754.
16. 107 Kan. 153, 204 Pac. 754.
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trusts were declared within the statute, only the question of
whether they exercised powers and privileges not possessed
by individuals or partnerships was considered. They ignored
the problem or else flatly assumed that the trust was an as-
sociation. So, too, in the Idaho case,17 was this problem ig-
nored.
Now the fact is indisputable that every partnership must
be an association in the sense that the individual mem-
bers thereof are associated together for a common
purpose-the management of a business for profit. It has
been shown at length that certain types of business trusts
are really partnerships, where the certificate holders retain
a substantial control over the trustees. In such cases, as
explained before, the certificate holders are held to be the
principals who are conducting the business for profit, and
the trustees are merely their agents. They are the socii,
united as partners in a common enterprise and hence must
be denominated an association such as the Missouri statute
refers to.
The status of such business trusts must then necessarily
be fixed as corporations. The certificate holders are, in
effect, an association of individuals who operate the business
and that association certainly possesses many of the powers
and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships,
within the meaning of the Missouri statutory definition of
a corporation. In view of this, it would seem logical to sup-
pose that "quo warranto would lie against any association of
persons who act as a corporation within this State without
being legally incorporated' ".18 Such an association is noth-
ing more or less than a subterfuge to enjoy corporate privi-
leges without incurring corporate obligations.
Indeed a Kansas City Court of Appeals case,19 following a
17. Spotswood v. Morris, 12 Idaho 360.
18. Opinion No. 575. Aug. 19, 1919, of Attorney General of State of
Ohio.
19. Schmidt v. Stortz, 236 S. W. 694.
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similar California decision,20 holds that such a trust is an
"unincorporated association" organized to sell shares with-
in the Blue Sky Law (Section 11919 Art. 7. Ch. 108 R. S. Mto.
1919) and not having obtained permission to sell its certi-
ficates, is illegal.
On the other hand, the recent case of State v. Lee21 seems
to intimate that such a common law trust need not be incor-
porated. The Missouri Supreme Court says: "It is ob-
vious that the article of the Constitution and statute re-
ferred to do not by legislative fiat convert joint-stock com-
panies or voluntary associations into corporations or re-
quire their incorporation before doing business." But
the court was considering whether a building and loan as-
sociation, which was organized under peculiar Missouri
statutes relating to such associations, was a corporation
and it is hardly probable that the decision embraces the
ordinary type of trust under consideration. Moreover in
Williams v. United States Express Company,22 the Court
of Appeals held that a joint stock company was a corpora-
tion and could be sued as such. Since the business trust
.of the partnership type is an association, it may fairly be
concluded that it, too, is a corporation and may be sued
as such.
Moreover, business trusts of this nature organized in
other States may be kept from doing business in Missouri
until they conform to Missouri corporation laws. They
may be considered as corporations, and the State may im-
pose any conditions it deems expedient as conditions pre-
cedent to their establishment in Missouri.
All this may be said of any business trust in which there
are associate powers among the certificate holders. But a
more difficult task is encountered in determining the status
20. Ex parte Gerard 200 Pac. 593.
21. 233 S. W. 20.
22. 195 Mo. App. 362.
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of a pure trust. Is it an association within the meaning
of R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 9722, and therefore subject to regu-
lation by the State as a corporation?
In view of a leading English decision 3 and a United States
Supreme Court opinion' in which the matter is discussed,
the contention that a pure trust is an association is barely
tenable. In such a business trust the beneficiaries have no
relation whatever inter se. It is admitted that they are
not partners nor associates for any purpose. They have
no title in the corpus of the trust, no shareholders meet-
ings, no control of the management or trustees, nor can a
provision in a declaration of trust that the beneficiaries
shall be trust beneficiaries only, without partnership, as-
sociate or any other relations whatever inter se, show any
possible intention on their part to form an association.
Their sole relationship is that they have individual and sepa-
rate beneficial interests in a trust fund.
In the leading English case of Smith v. Anderson,25 pre-
viously referred to, the court had occasion to decide whether
a pure trust was an association within the meaning of the
Companies Act, 1862, s. 4. This extract from the Court's
opinion may well be quoted: "I cannot find that this deed
constitutes any association whatever between the persons
who are supposed to be socii. * * * There has never been any-
thing creating any mutual rights or obligations between
those persons. They are from the first entire strangers
who have entered into no contract whatever with each
other, nor has either of them entered into any contract
with the trustees or any trustee on behalf of the other,
there being nothing in the deed pointing to any mandate
or delegation of authority to anybody to act for the certi-
ficate holders as between themselves, and nothing, as it
appears to me, by which any liability could ever be cast
23. L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 247.
24. 249 U. S. 223.
25 L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 247.
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upon the certificate holders either as between themselves,
or as between anybody else.* * Persons who have no mutual
rights and obligations do not, according to my view, con..
Qtitute an association because they happen to have a com-
mon interest or several interests in something which is to
be divided between them."
The United States Supreme Court, in Crocker v. Mal.
ley,26 also seems to adhere to the view that the pure trust
is not an association. In that case the Massachusetts Realty
Trust brought an action to recover income taxes paid to
the collector of Internal Revenue. The question before the
court was whether that company, which was a pure trust,
was a joint-stock association within the meaning of the
Income Tax Act, Oct. 3, 1913. In holding that it was not
Mr. Justice Holmes said: "* * * it would be a wide
departure from normal usage to call beneficiaries here a
joint-stock association when they are admitted not to be
partners in any sense, and when they have no joint action
or interest and no control over the fund. On the other
hand, the trustees by themselves cannot be a joint-stock as-
sociation within the meaning of the Act unless all trustees
with discretionary powers are such. * We perceive
no ground for grouping the two-beneficiaries and trus-
tees-together, in order to turn them into an association,
by uniting their contrasted functions and powers, although
they are in no proper sense associated." Thus the trust
was held to be free from any liability to pay taxes as a
joint-stock association.
Having concluded this phase of the subject, a brief sum-
mary of the legal status of business trusts in Missouri
may now be reached. There seem to be, in the last analysis,
two separate and distinct classes of these business trusts.
Where the cestuis que trustent retain a substantial control
over the trustees, the organization has been denominated
26. 249 U. S. 223.
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a partnership. ,nch a trust is an association and possesses
powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or part-
nerships within the provisions of Sec. 9722 R. S. Mo. 1919
and Article 12 Sec. 11 of the Constitution of Missouri. It
then becomes a onrporation by statutory definition. In
view of State v. LessF7 it would seem that the only appar-
ent effect of this statute is to permit such a trust to sue
and be sued as a corporation and not to require it to be-
come incorporated. However, this case is decided with
reference to peculiar specific statutes affecting building
and loan associations. Such specific statutes would nor-
mally take precedence over a general statute of the nature
that has been considered. Therefore, until the contrary
is held, this class of business trusts seems to be illegal, as
usurping corporate powers and privileges without being
legally incorporated.
The second class of business trusts in which there are
no associate powers among the beneficiaries, has been termed
a pure trust. It is a legal organization, it is not amenable
to Missouri corporation laws, nor is it subject to the Fed-
eral Income Tax Act, as such." It seems, though, that the
Missouri courts would hold even the pure trust subject to
the regulation of the Missouri "blue sky" law, as to the
issuing of shares of certificates 9
In conclusion, it would seem that the line of demarcation
between the illegal organization and the legal one (the
pure trust) is not an absolute, arbitrary one. Therefore,
in fixing the status of any particular organization, the
courts will have to arrive at the intention of the settlors
as evidenced by the declaration of trust. If this instru-
ment disclaims any associate powers among the beneficiar-
ies, and the actual passive conduct of such beneficiaries
27. 233 S. W. 20.
28. However, under the more specific Income Tax Act of 1921, pure
trusts were held amenable to the Act.
29. Schmidt v. Stortz, 236 S. W. 694.
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proves only an intention to form a pure trust, then the
courts, in the absence of any future specific statutes, must
declare them a valid, legal organization.
As a matter of practical consideration, however, it seems
improbable that business men will invest their capital in
a pure trust, in which they have no voice in the manage-
ment or control, in proportion to the respective voting
powers of their certificates. Practically, then, most of these
organizations will prove to be adroit, ingenious schemes for
circumventing corporate liability, and these the courts must
oust. But in some fields the pure trust has proved a very
serviceable, practical organization, particularly in the busi-
ness of dealing in real propery.30 Such trusts, it may well
be presumed, will be held valid by the Supreme Court of
Missouri when the matter arises for adjudication.
BExA ,mN MARKs, '23.
30. Business Trusts as substitutes for Business Corporations, Thompson,
p. 43.
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